Risk assessment
Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment Aligned to ISO/SAE 21434
At a glance
- Concept
- Architecture
- Verification
- Standards referenced
- ISO/SAE 21434UNECE R155
- Core deliverables
- Item definition
- Asset and damage scenario register
- Threat scenarios and attack paths
- Risk assessment record
The problem we are asked to solve
- TARA results differ between teams because the method is applied inconsistently.
- Risk ratings cannot be explained during assessment or audit.
- Threat scenarios are not connected to real architecture or interfaces.
- Risk treatment decisions are never revisited after the concept phase.
What changes as a result
- A repeatable, documented TARA method across programmes
- Risk decisions that can be explained and defended
- Clear link between threat scenarios and cybersecurity goals
- A maintainable basis for later verification activities
Scope of work
What the engagement covers
Scope is agreed per programme. These are the activities we most often deliver for this service.
- Item definition and asset identification
- Damage scenario and impact rating
- Threat scenario identification
- Attack path analysis
- Attack feasibility rating
- Risk determination and treatment decisions
- Cybersecurity goal derivation
- TARA method definition and tooling support
- TARA review and re-assessment
Engagement methodology
How we work
A predictable sequence, adapted to your process and release gates rather than replacing them.
- 01
Define the item
Bound the analysis: what is inside the item, which interfaces cross the boundary, and what is out of scope.
- 02
Identify assets and damage
Derive damage scenarios from consequences for road users and operators, then rate impact consistently.
- 03
Build threat scenarios
Identify threat scenarios and attack paths against the real architecture rather than a generic model.
- 04
Rate and decide
Assess attack feasibility, determine risk, and record treatment decisions with named owners.
- 05
Derive goals
Convert accepted risk treatment into cybersecurity goals and claims the engineering team can implement.
Deliverables
Every engagement ends with artefacts your organisation owns and can defend in review.
- Item definition
- Asset and damage scenario register
- Threat scenarios and attack paths
- Risk assessment record
- Risk treatment decisions
- Cybersecurity goals and claims
Relevant standards
We help organisations interpret and implement these requirements. We do not certify or approve organisations.
- ISO/SAE 21434
- UNECE R155
Typical use cases
- First TARA for a new item or platform
- Harmonising TARA method across business units
- Re-assessment after architecture or feature change
- Preparing risk evidence for a type-approval submission
Evidence
Case studies covering TARA and ISO/SAE 21434 work are being prepared for publication. Automotive security engagements are normally confidential, so we discuss comparable scope, method, and deliverables directly rather than publishing unverifiable claims.
Questions
Frequently asked
Which TARA method do you use?
Can you review a TARA we have already completed?
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Often delivered together
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Discuss Your Cybersecurity Program
Tell us where the programme is today and we will outline a realistic next step.